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aygolmohamadi

Empirical results

Introduction

Lack of a perfect capital market necessitates the need for capital structure (CS) policy [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The choice of debt and equity is important not only for stable corporate financial health but also for the role it plays in economic growth [6,7]. Since Modigliani and Miller’s [8] slice-of-the-cake argument, the literature has identified many firm-specific CS determinants [6,9] as well as macroeconomic factors [7,10, 11, 12]. Country corruption facets, such as weak regulations and inconsistent policies at the macro level, may affect financing decisions as they influence agency conflicts of interest, the risk of financial fraud, and resource waste at the business level [10,13]. Such consequences are exacerbated if accompanied by weak disclosure policies that enhance the information asymmetry problem and increase the cost of capital [14]. Consequently, financial market activity reduces as a result of investors’ low confidence.

Public corruption is a potential determinant of CS that is largely ignored. A common link is through asymmetric information as a result of ineffective management transparency, monitoring, and law enforcement [15]. This information gap is also caused by manager-shareholder agency conflicts [16]. Because of poor ruling systems and regulations, emerging countries are deemed more corrupt than developed countries [17]. Non-financial enterprises are less regulated compared with financial firms, and thus they are more exposed to corruption [18].

Conclusions

This study investigates the CS practices of non-financial companies operating in the MENA region. Country-level corruption and the Arab Spring’s effect on CS is analyzed through the application of static and dynamic models. Country corruption has an effect on CS because of the significant agency problems and information asymmetry that are associated with corrupt practices. The developing countries in the MENA region are more susceptible to corruption because of inadequate governance systems and regulations, which make them a suitable choice for this study.

Our contribution to the literature on capital structure is threefold. The study expands the research on CS across countries in a geographic area that has been relatively overlooked in previous scholarly works. Our second contribution is emphasizing the significance of enhancing institutional environments in developing countries to facilitate firms’ access to external finance, particularly when the level of corruption in a country is found to have a significant effect on the decisions that corporations make about their CS. Finally, addressing the effect of the Arab Spring, a period of political instability, on the CS decisions is the first instance in which such an analysis has been conducted. The findings of this research are likely to be significant to other developing countries and regions and carry major implications for emerging economies that share similar attributes.